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Party System Closure and Openness: 
Conceptualization, Operationalization and Validation 
 
Introduction 
The literature on party system dynamics, and more specifically on party system 
stabilization is burgeoning, and yet political science lacks reliable indicators of the stability 
and predictability of party relations. Comparative research would greatly benefit from indices 
that travel well across political regimes and allow for statistical analyses. 
The lack of effective operationalization has both conceptual and measurement-related 
reasons. The studies on the change and stability of party systems written in the Rokkanian- 
(Europe), the realignment- (U.S.), or the Mainwaringian (Latin America) traditions focus on 
the anchors of parties in the society, and not on the patterns of interactions. The latter 
phenomenon is emphasized by what could be called the Sartorian school. But Sartori (1976) 
himself was more interested in the variance among institutionalized systems, and less in the 
dimension of stability. 
This is less true about the central author of the Sartorian school, Peter Mair. His 
concept of party system closure (Mair 1996) is one of the most important theoretical 
innovations in recent party system research. The concept refers to the stability of the 
interactions of parties in the governmental arena. Party systems are closed if the parties stick 
to old alliances and if the process of government-building is confined to a small group of 
established parties. 
While Mair needs to be credited for the invention and the imaginative original 
operationalization of the concept, there are major problems with the latter aspect, hindering 
the application of the concept to existing party systems. The present article is aimed at 
elaborating, operationalizing and validating the concept of closure and at suggesting 
indicators that are conceptually and empirically superior to the ones suggested by scholars so 
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far. We demonstrate that the existing operationalizations are incoherent and they misrepresent 
the actual degree of predictability. We offer indicators that are uniform and transparent in 
their logic of construction, can be applied both to specific government-changes and to time 
periods and grasp the degree of change more precisely.  
The close examination of a wide array of indicators shows that there is a hierarchy 
among the components of the latent variable of closure. Governmental formula is the most, 
the pattern of alternation is the least central element of party system closure. Closure is shown 
to covary with the length of democratic past, but the relationship between democratic 
consolidation and party system closure does not appear as deterministic. 
The first section of the article briefly reviews the literature on the operationalization of 
party system stability, highlighting also the importance of the latter concept within the field of 
party politics. Mair´s theoretical framework is presented in the second section. After the 
review of the traditional indicators used to measure systemic closure, we turn to the 
discussion of their weaknesses and to the presentation of new, improved, indicators. Section 
five sets the objectives of the empirical analysis as well as presents a new data-set on 
government formation in Europe since 1848. The final section compares how well these new 
indicators perform in relation to the ones previously employed, providing a new historical 
ranking of party system closure in 48 European democracies. The main findings of the article 
are summarised in the conclusion. 
 
Conceptual background 
The stabilization and predictability of party systems appears through a wide variety of 
indicators in the literature. Some authors rely on the Pedersen index of electoral volatility (e.g. 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995), others on the volatility of ‘old’ parties (Meleshevich 2007). 
Some works use the ‘effective’ number of parties as a proxy (Bielasiak 2002; Morlino 1998; 
Tóka 1997), others the number of ‘splits’, ‘mergers’ and ‘name changes’ (Welfling 1973). 
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Indices that reflect the concentration of votes or the ideological distribution of political parties 
(Krupavicius 1999: 2-4), the affiliation strategies of politicians and voters (Kreuzer and Pettai 
2003), the difference in vote share between the two largest parties (Birch 2003: 99-103), or 
the progressive enhancement of the proportion of the total vote for political parties over time 
(Lewis 2006: 574-575) are also interpreted as measuring stability and consolidation.  
These operationalizations all reflect important aspects of party politics but none of 
them targets specifically the most crucial aspect of party systems: the pattern of inter-party 
competition (Sartori 1976: 43-44). Mair’s index of party system closure, on the other hand, 
directly follows the interaction-based, Sartorian understanding of party systems. A system is 
considered to be closed if the protagonists and the patterns of their alliances are stable. 
Closed party systems can be regarded as ‘strong institutions’. In closed systems the 
relevant actors – voters, politicians, sponsors, activists, etc. – are aware that challenging the 
existing party labels and alliances entails high costs and they adjust their behavior to these 
expectations. In closed systems the changes in the social context of parties either express 
themselves through channels that are external to party-systems or gradually transform the 
major parties from inside. But they do not alter the menu of core players or the fundamental 
relations among them. Accountability is more easily exercised in such systems because 
responsibility can be assigned to few meaningful political units (parties or party-alliances) 
with long time horizon.  
The advantage of open systems, on the other hand, is that they provide better 
conditions for the rise of innovative forces and they constrain the tendencies towards 
cartelization. The advantages of open systems are less commonly emphasized in the literature 
because openness is typically discussed either in the context of new democracies which often 
carry the double burden of inchoate party politics and fragile political institutions, or in the 
context of those established democracies that shifted towards openness in the midst of 
declining trust and turnout. One must acknowledge, however, that the adaptability of party 
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systems, as of any system, requires constant innovation. The disadvantages of openness may 
outweigh its positive implications, but the net consequences need to be measured and not 
taken for granted.    
While many empirical works in the party system literature (e.g. Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995; Morlino 1998; Kreuzer and Pettai 2003) are based on the behavior of voters or 
of politicians, the concept of closure reflects the choices made by parties, and, specifically, by 
parties that have governing potential. The advantage of this approach is exactly what seems to 
be its weakness: it says very little about individual politicians and voters. As closure primarily 
reflects the choices of parties, it becomes possible to investigate whether these choices affect 
voters or individual politicians. The more disciplined and consistent are the parties in playing 
the coalition-game, the more loyalty can be expected from the voters (Mair, 1997).  
Parties, of course, interact in other spheres as well, not only in the governmental arena. 
Alliances can be built also on parliamentary, electoral, regional, international or policy-
making levels (Bardi and Mair 2008; Smith 1990: 165; etc.). But there are good reasons to 
focus on the national governmental coalitions. First, the seizure of governmental power is the 
principal, even if not the only, prize of party competition. Second, to join a particular 
government or not is a relatively autonomous decision of a party. Therefore it is more likely 
to betray the party’s fundamental character than the developments in the electoral or policy-
making spheres, which are typically less under the control of parties1. 
The present article accepts the fundamental thrust of Mair’s (1996) approach, but it 
refines his conceptual apparatus and replaces the existing indicators, used by Mair and others, 
with new ones. We suggest indicators of closure that are conceptually well justified, uniform 
and transparent in their logic of construction, allow the characterization of both individual 
governments and time periods, and capture the degree of change precisely.  
                                                 
1 Surely, the membership in governments and the choice of partners are also influenced by a number of factors, 
including election outcomes and institutional provisions. The degree to which this is the case requires further 
analyses that take closure as dependent variable.  
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The three components of closure 
Mair (1997: 206, 2001, 2007) proposed three major components of party system 
closure. The first is alternation in government. In this regard three patterns exist: wholesale-, 
partial-, and non-alternation. In the first case the incumbent government leaves the office in 
its entirety and is replaced by a completely different group of parties. The second option 
materializes when the new cabinet is a mixture of parties from inside and outside of the 
previous government. The third possibility is marked by a complete absence of alternation, as 
the same parties remain in exclusive control of government over an extended period of time 
being displaced neither wholly nor partially. 
The second major component of the model, government formulae, shows whether the 
partisan composition of the governments is innovative or familiar. If there are stable groups of 
parties that tend to govern together, then familiarity, i.e. closure, prevails. If there is a 
tendency towards previously unseen party compositions, the system is considered to be open, 
innovative. 
The final component is access to government. The relevant difference on this aspect is 
between, on one hand, systems in which all parties have the opportunity to participate in 
government and, on the other hand, configurations in which some of the parties are 
permanently excluded. Closed governments consist exclusively of parties that governed in the 
past, the open ones include, or are even dominated, by novices.  
Mair was not entirely consistent in the use of the three-component model. In Mair 
(2007) he introduced the frequency of party composition changes as a fourth component. But 
we do not include the latter phenomenon into our analyses as it refers more to cabinet stability 
than to the stability of the structure of competition. In fact, there may be systems (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Lithuania or Kosovo) where cabinets tend to change only after elections, but the 
structure of inter-partisan competition is largely unpredictable; and others (e.g. Belgium, Italy 
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or inter-war Czechoslovakia) where parties collaborate and compete in a structured manner 
despite frequent governmental changes.  The concept of party system closure was originally 
invented to capture the stability of partisan interactions rather than the regularity with which 
the latter takes place. 
 By assessing these three factors one can determine whether a party system is closed or 
open (Table 1). Party systems are considered to be open when (1) the alternations of 
governments tend to be partial, (2) no stable configuration of governing alternatives exists and 
(3) the access to government is granted to all relevant parties, including the newly established 
ones. It is closed when (1) alternations of governments are wholesale or none, (2) the 
governing alternatives are stable over a long period of time, and (3) governments are confined 
to a narrow circle of parties. Malta or the U.S. are clear examples of closed systems, while the 
Baltic countries tend to be open due to the high frequency of partial cabinet alternation, 
innovative government-composition and frequent incorporation of new parties into the 
government. 
Table 1. Components of party system closure 
Components Structure of competition 
Closed Open 
Alternation in government Wholesale/None Partial 
Governing formulae Familiar Innovative 
Access to government Closed Open 
Source: Adapted from Mair (1996:95) 
 
There is lack of discussion in the literature about the relationship among the three 
components. A positive covariation would be in line with the fact that all three components 
are supposed to be related to the same underlying concept. But since these phenomena are not 
consequences of closure but components of it, a strictly unidimensional structure is not 
necessary. Moreover, using ecological systems as analogies, extreme values on all three 
aspects may be expected to be dysfunctional. Regimes that are completely rigid or open in all 
regards may not be able to survive. If so, then there could be a certain amount of trade-off 
between the three components, possibly even producing negative correlations. 
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The mechanical relationships among the three variables, however, increase the 
likelihood for a positive covariation. The instance of no-alternation implies familiar coalition 
formulae and closed access. Open access presupposes innovative cabinet formula and partial 
or total alternation. Due to these relationships, there can be a certain amount of bias towards 
positive correlation among the three variables.  
One may expect positive correlations also because all three components are part of, 
and can be under the influence of, the more general phenomenon of party system stabilization. 
On a sample of ten countries Enyedi and Casal Bértoa (2011) found that party systems with 
low number of parties, stable and relevant party blocs, low electoral volatility and high level 
of polarization tend to have higher party system closure. The positive correlation among the 
three components may be a result of the impact of these – partly exogenous – variables. 
Mair does not comment on the relative centrality/marginality of the three components 
within the syndrome of closure. On a conceptual basis, and based on historical experiences, 
the pattern of alternation does not correspond directly to the degree of stability. While the 
appearance of new parties or of new coalitions of parties implies openness of the system in an 
unequivocal way, the link between partial alternation and instability is less straightforward. If 
the incumbent parties have only limited options for partners, for example Christian Democrats 
can align only with Socialists or with Liberals, as in the classical Benelux pattern, then the 
predictability of coalitions is relatively high in spite of the partialness of government 
alternation. Citizens either get a center-left or a center-right government. Partial alternation 
therefore does not necessarily equal fluidity, contrary to innovative formulae and the inclusion 
of new parties into the government. 
 
Existing indicators 
The concept of party system closure has already inspired a number of party scholars. 
Some of them used the original measures proposed by Mair (e.g. Toole 2000; Linz and 
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Montero 2001; Müller and Fallend 2004; O´Dywer 2006; Rybář 2004), while others 
developed new, dichotomous or continuous indicators, and Mair himself kept changing the 
measures. The original conceptualization suggested a dichotomous operationalization (e.g. 
Henjak 2003; Stoychev 2008): governmental formulae are either innovative or familiar, the 
governments either include newcomers or not, alternation is either wholesale (i.e. total or 
none) or partial. Müller-Rommel (2005) applied a score of 0 to no-alternation, innovation and 
access, 1 to wholesale alternation, familiar formula and closed access and 2 to partial 
alternation. Enyedi and Casal Bértoa (2011) assigned 0 to partial alternation, innovation and 
access, and 1 to wholesale alternation, familiar formula, and closed access. 
Some studies (Mair 2007; Casal Bértoa and Mair 2010) used continuous variables to 
grasp the degree of change. For capturing alternation in government Mair (2007) applied 
Pedersen´s (1979) index of electoral volatility to the ministerial turnover (calling it the index 
of governmental alternation, IGA). Thereby IGA was computed by adding the net change in 
percentage of ministers (including the prime minister) gained and lost by each party in the 
cabinet from one government to the next, and then dividing the result by two. Concerning the 
familiarity/innovation of formulae Mair’s continuous indicator relied on the number of 
innovative governments as a percentage of all governments in a particular period.2 Finally, for 
access Casal Bértoa and Mair created an index of openness (IO) which “measures the weight 
new parties have in a particular cabinet as well as the weight such governments (with new 
parties) enjoy in the party system as a whole” (2012: 101). IO is calculated by dividing the 
number of new governing parties by the total number of governing parties. 
 
Critique of existing operationalizations and construction of new indicators 
The operationalizations summarized above have merits, but also considerable 
weaknesses. Dichotomous measures are obviously crude indicators. A large new party in the 
                                                 
2 This index (called IIA in Casal Bértoa and Mair 2012) is not applicable to individual governments. 
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government represents a larger rupture with the past than a small one. Therefore, in principle, 
continuous variables that are sensitive to the degree of change should be preferred. The exact 
construction of continuous variables requires, however, additional theoretical and empirical 
justifications. As demonstrated below, the existing continuous variables are all flawed in one 
way or another. Our effort is aimed at correcting their flaws and suggesting new indices that 
follow a uniform logic. This common logic implies taking the percentage of minister-changes 
as the basis for all the three variables3. 
One of the fundamental problems with Mair’s original operationalization is the way 
how government-change is defined. Traditionally, as summarized for example by Müller and 
Strøm (2000:12), three criteria are used to indicate a change of government: (1) a change in 
the partisan composition of the government coalition; (2) a change of the head of government; 
and (3) new elections. Contrary to this standard, Mair defined individual governments 
exclusively in terms of changes in partisan composition. As a result, if the same coalition 
continues after an election Mair has one entry in his dataset for the pre- and post-election 
period, not two. We agree with Mair’s decision not to consider changes in prime ministers as 
relevant end-points. The significance of the replacement of the PM typically does not reach 
the weight of a new election or the political relevance of a coalition break-up. PM-changes 
which are not results of elections and are not accompanied by party-composition-changes tend 
to concentrate in countries where the position of the premier is less important. Elections, on 
the other hand, are defining political events as they always give the possibility for the 
reconfiguration of the party landscape. At each new election the citizens and the political class 
face a dilemma: to continue with the old patterns or to innovate. Continuity in these cases is 
therefore noteworthy. The challenge arising from a PM’s resignation is typically managed by 
a small group of politicians within the dominant party, while a national parliamentary election 
                                                 
3 Similarly to Mair we consider ministers and not ministries, and we count them as equally relevant. 
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‘tests’ the entire society. Therefore, we consider both elections and changes in partisan 
composition as signaling the end of a government. 
There is an additional reason for implementing this modification of the unit of 
measurement: we want to record instance of ‘no-alternation’. As reviewed above, according 
to Mair’s original conceptualization a system should be considered to be closed whenever a 
particular government stays in power continuously. This plausible logic, however, is not well 
reflected in the scores of closure if one counts individual government as Mair did because 
cases of no alternation are non-existent in the dataset by definition. To give an example, India 
was a particularly closed system during its first two decades of democracy according to the 
Mair’s definition but using his operationalization this cannot be demonstrated as India hasn’t 
experienced a single change of partisan composition during this period.  
For characterizing time-spans the literature tends to average the scores of consecutive 
governments, disregarding how long the governments lasted. We suggest taking the duration 
of the governments into account by multiplying the characteristics of a particular government 
by the number of years the government lasted. Closure scores were assigned to specific years 
too. If the country had more governments in a year then their average was used to characterize 
the particular year.  
As far as other aspects of the counting rules are concerned, we largely follow Mair. 
‘Grand coalitions’, i.e. coalitions bringing together the most relevant parties (e.g. Kiesinger’s 
1966 or Merkel’s 2005 cabinets) are included into our dataset, but non-partisan, acting, in 
exile, provisional, technocratic governments are not. To name a few, the latter categories 
include the Poincaré (1926), Brünning (1930), Churchill (1940) or, more recently, the 
Tosovky (1998), Georgievski (2001), Monti (2010), Papademos (2011), Oreharski (2013) or 
Letta (until November 2013) governments. While the frequency of such governments has 
recently increased, their formation, change or dissolution responds to very idiosyncratic 
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circumstances, and therefore their inclusion would blur the analysis fo the regular patterns of 
party competition.  
We start our counting from the moment a so-called founding government is 
established, provided that a country is both (1) democratic (see above) and (2) independent. 
Following Casal Bértoa and Mair (2012: 91-92), we consider founding governments as those 
created by the first free election taking place in a country after regime collapse, independence, 
or after a revised constitution was approved by an interim Constituent Assembly (see also 
Müller-Rommel et al. 2004). 
The year when a country ceases to be democratic is excluded, except in those cases 
when the authoritarian transition was preceded by a change of government or by elections 
taking place during that year. 
So far we have discussed how the units of measurement are defined and what the 
overall logic behind the proposed operationalizations is. Now we turn to the measurement of 
the three constituting components.  
 
Alternation in government 
As mentioned above, Mair (2007) suggested ministerial volatility as the indicator of 
alternation. Higher volatility was expected to reflect high closure. The implicit logic behind 
this operationalization is that the most closed party systems are characterized by a bipolar 
pattern of competition undergoing regular and complete alternation. The primary example is 
the classical U.K. pattern. But consider a stable Social Democratic-Green coalition which is 
enlarged from time to time with a five percent strong Left-Libertarian party. In such situations 
continuity prevails and change/surprise is marginal. Using Mair’s index one would, however, 
mistakenly conclude that the system is particularly open, unpredictable as the Pedersen index 
would amount to a mere five percent.  
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The bias in the operationalization stems from the fact that only wholesale alternation is 
recognized as closure, no-alternation is not. Correcting for this bias means that each party-
composition change needs to be placed on a continuum between total4 and no alternation. The 
degree of stability is indicated by the distance from that endpoint of the continuum  (0 or 100) 
which is further away. If 85% of a government is changed then the case is an instance of 
almost total alternation. The figure 85 expresses well this high degree of stability. But if only 
10% of the ministers belong to new parties, in other words if the government is identical with 
some previous government in 90%, then stability is even higher than in the previous case. The 
numeric value assigned to the latter case should be 90, and not 10. Using this logic each 
government-change receives a figure that ranges between 50 and 100, the former indicating 
openness, the latter indicating closure. In order to have the same range (0-100) for the 
alternation score as for the other two components 50 was subtracted from it and the result was 
multiplied with 2. 
 
Government formula 
Concerning alternation and access (see below), the construction of percentage-based 
measures is relatively simple. With the familiarity of government formulae there is more 
complication. It is probably not accidental that no continuous indicator exists in the literature 
that could be applied to single governments. 
In extreme cases the construction of the variable is easy. If the very same combination 
of parties has already governed together in the analyzed period, there is a 100 percent 
familiarity. If the government is based on an entirely new combination of parties, the 
familiarity figure is 0. In the more complicated case when only part of the new government 
replicates a previous government we suggest to use as indicator of closure the percentage of 
                                                 
4 Note that total alternation can go together with openness if the new government is composed of entirely new 
actors. All operationalizations of alternation, including ours, underestimate the actual degree of openness in these 
(rare) instances. In spite of this bias the overall index of party system closure will have a low score as both 
formula and access figures will be 0.  
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the ministers who belong to the ‘familiar’ part of the previous government. The contrast needs 
to be made with the previous government that is most similar in terms of the list of parties to 
the analyzed government. A cabinet of Communists, Socialists and Greens is not compared to 
the one with Communists, Socialists and Liberals, but to the one with Communists, Socialists, 
Greens and Populists. 
In case of party mergers we consider the percentage of ministers belonging to each of 
the merged parties. If a minister cannot be linked to any of the pre-merger parties then he/she 
is excluded from the counting unless all the merged parties had already been previously in 
government together. 
What shall we do with single party governments? Again, if the party has never 
governed before, the adequate closure figure is 0, the formula is innovative. But what if the 
party used to be part of a coalition? We propose that the previous coalition partners’ 
percentage should be subtracted from 100. If the Social Democrats, who gave 90 percent of 
the ministers, decide to continue without the Greens, who dominated only one tenth of the 
government, then closure is high, 90. In the opposite case the innovation is considerable, since 
a small, marginal party turns into the sole government-party. Closure then equals 10. The 
index of government formula will range between 0 and 100. 
 
Access to government 
The existing continuous indicator of access to government (the ratio between the new 
governing parties and all governing parties, Casal Bértoa and Mair’s IO) also needs to be 
altered, in two ways. First, the values need to be reversed so that they express the degree of 
closure, in line with the other two components. Second, in order to capture the magnitude of 
change, the percentage of ministers who are controlled by particular parties should be taken 
into account, again similarly to the other two indicators. The proposed measure is therefore 
the percentage of old governing parties. Old governing parties are considered to be all those 
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parties which have already been constituent parts of a previous government. The indicator 
again varies between 0 and 100. The ministers of a merged party are considered to be ‘old’ if 
the predecessor-parties governed before, otherwise they are considered to be new.  
Table 2. New and old operationalizations of alternation, formula and access 
Component New continuous Old continuous Old dichotomous 
Alternation if  
. MV is above 50% = MV 
. MV is below 50% = 100%-MV 
Pedersen´s index of 
ministerial 
volatility (i.e. MV) 
total alternation or 
none 
Formulae if  
. the very same combination = 100%  
. entirely new combination/ 
new party forms single party 
government = 0% 
. part of the new government is 
familiar =  % of the familiar part  
. a party which was earlier in 
government forms a government on 
its own = 100 - the previous coalition 
partners’ % 
number of familiar 
governments 
divided by all 
governments 
familiar party 
composition 
Access % of ministers belonging to parties 
previously in government 
number of 
previously 
governing parties 
divided by the total 
number of parties 
in each government 
(average) 
no new party joins 
 
The composite indicator of closure 
A country’s composite closure score will equal the average score of the three 
variables. Researchers may consider using our index in two further alternative forms. The first 
is using the standardized versions (Z scores) of the original variables, the second is projecting 
them onto a 0 to 1 scale. Sometimes it is beneficial to center the variable around the mean, as 
Z scores do, but then one must consider that the scores will depend on the specific sample 
used. The 0 to1 alternative is particularly suitable for regression analyses. In the current paper 
we opted for the 0 to 100 scale because it can be interpreted as percentage of stability and it 
clearly communicates the message, just as the Pedersen index does, that stability prevails over 
change.    
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In summary, the new indicators suggested above (table 2) have the following 
characteristics: they (1) are based on the percentage-change of ministers, (2) are continuous, 
(3) treat no-alternation as a form of closure, (4) apply specific counting rules when calculating 
the familiarity of the coalition formulae and, last but not least, (5) compute access on the basis 
of the percentage of ministers belonging to previously governing parties. In contrast to the 
existing continuous measures, which were constructed according to diverging logic (e.g. 
Casal Bértoa and Mair 2012), the indicators proposed above enable the creation of a 
composite closure score. 
Below we calculate both the cabinet-based and the year-based solutions for all the 
three major alternatives of operationalization: the dichotomous ones (Müller-Rommel 2005), 
the continuous ones suggested by the existing literature (Mair 2007, Casal Bértoa and Mair 
2010) and our two new measures, out of which we recommend for further analyses the year-
by-year measure. As a result, altogether six alternative solutions for measuring closure are 
contrasted.  
 
Goals of the empirical analysis and data-set 
The empirical analysis below serves three purposes. The first goal is to learn about the 
relationships between the three constituting variables of party system closure. To what extent 
closed pattern on one dimension implies closure on the other? Which of the three variables is 
most central for the overall phenomenon of closure? Is a unidimensional conception of party 
system closure warranted? The second task is to establish whether the index proposed by us 
has more attractive features in terms of reliability and validity than the existing ones? Finally, 
the third purpose of the exercise is to provide data about the frequency of closed and open 
patterns and to establish a ranking of European party systems in terms of closure, opening the 
way for further studies that treat closure as dependent or independent variable. In order to 
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achieve these three goals we rely on a new data-set that covers European governments 
between 18485 and 2013. 
The dataset comprises European party systems under democratic conditions. We 
consider a country to be democratic when (1) it has obtained a score of 6 or more in the Polity 
IV index, (2) elections take place according to universal (at least male) suffrage and (3) 
cabinets are formed on the basis of a parliamentary majority. The dataset contains information 
on cabinet duration, the partisan composition of cabinets, and on the number of ministers 
belonging to each governmental party. The dataset covers 165 years, 46 European 
democracies, 64 different historical party systems, 630 elections6 and 1483 cases of 
government formation. 
However, and before scrutinizing the empirical data we need to make a couple of 
caveats in relation to the issue of the time-frame. In the analyses below we present data for the 
entire life-span of 60 European party systems. This implies a very short period of time in 
some instances, for example in the case of the first Greek party system only two years, from 
1946 till 1948, while in others, for example in the Danish case, an entire century, from 1911 
till 2013. This focus on the core dataset will be complemented with the analysis of various 
subsamples: young (less than 23 years old), inter-war, recent (1990-2013), and East and West 
European party systems. Investigating multiple subsamples is not only in line with general 
methodological recommendations aimed at increasing the number of observations (King et al. 
1994: 24), but it has the additional advantage of providing samples within which the age, the 
geographical area, the historical era or the time-length of the party systems are held constant 
and therefore the comparability of the cases is less disputable. Obviously, for most of the 
actors a governmental formula that hasn’t been used for many decades can represent as much 
change as a completely new formula. Since no obvious temporal threshold can be defined the 
                                                 
5 This is the first year when the three above-cited democratic conditions can be observed in a country (i.e. France 
II Republic). 
6 The number of electoral cycles taken into account varies between just one (e.g. French II Republic or Polish I 
Republic) and forty (Denmark). 
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best strategy is to examine the relationship on samples with both varying and uniform time 
frames. 
 
Closure and openness in Europe 
The covariation among the three variables is best demonstrated with the help of the 
government-based dichotomous operationalization. Table 3 shows that out of the logically 
possible combinations some almost never occur. For example closed alternation, open 
formula and closed access was found only in a small minority of the cases. Partial alternation 
went together with closed formula and closed access somewhat more frequently. Total or no 
alternation often co-occurred with open formula and open access. The pure types of open and 
closed patterns were even more numerous. Within the universe of young party systems the 
most frequent pattern is a mixed one: partial alternation, innovative formula, and governments 
including no new party. In the overall sample of party systems the completely closed pattern 
occurs most often. 
Table 3. The distribution of the dichotomous indicators of closed and open patterns  
Alternation Formula Access First 23 years All periods 
- - + 188 265 
- - - 157 212 
+ + + 126 304 
+ - - 74 96 
- + + 68 146 
+ - + 19 32 
TOTAL N 632 1055 
Note: + = closed, - = open pattern 
The counting above does not consider how long the various patterns last. Examining the 
number of years spent under a particular pattern, we found that the completely closed 
configuration stands out as the most durable one. Out of the 2032 years taken into account 
1445 (71%) were spent under governments which were, in terms of coalition patterns, copies 
of earlier governments. The fundamental inertia of European party systems has been 
documented long time ago in terms of the behavior of citizens and the identity of parties 
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(Bartolini and Mair 1990), but apparently a similar degree of inertia exists also at the level of 
government-building.  
 We found the three variables to be positively related to each other according to all 
forms of operationalization. But the degree of coherence varied considerably. The reliability 
analyses and the factor analyses (Table 4) showed that formula is the kernel of closure. 
Formula had in all cases the largest loading on the main factor and contributed most to the 
Cronbach alphas. This was the case in the three subsamples as well, again according to all 
forms of operationalization (data not presented). Alternation and access have been found to be 
least tightly related. Apparently, party systems that tend to experience partial alternation do 
not necessarily allow new actors to join the circle of governing parties easily and open access 
to government may occur even under the circumstances of total alternation. The weak 
relationship between these two components undermines the unidimensionality of the 
construct.  
Table 4. Coherence of the closure-construct according to the various operationalizations: 60 
party systems (1848-2013) 
 New 
continuous 
(years) 
New 
continuous 
(governments) 
Old 
continuous 
(years) 
Old 
continuous 
(government) 
Old 
dichotomous 
(years) 
Old 
dichotomous  
(government) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.74 .61 .75 .63 .89 .77 
Component 
without 
which the 
alpha 
would 
increase 
alternation alternation access  access access access 
Component 
without 
which the 
alpha 
would drop 
most 
formula formula formula formula formula formula 
Mean inter-
item 
correlation 
.5 .26 .49 .31 .79 .53 
Number of 
principal 
components 
1 2 1 2 1 1 
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These results do not imply, however, that the composite variable of closure lacks 
internal homogeneity. The variables based on year-by-year measurements are particularly 
coherent: the factor analyses indicated that they are structured around one principal 
component, the Cronbach alphas were above 0.7 (the conventional psychometric standard), 
and the inter-item correlations were around 0.5.  
In order to check the inter-temporal reliability of the measures we have compared the 
closure index of 18 Western European democracies7 (the relatively stable part of our sample) 
in 2000 and in 2013. The scores of the two time-points correlated almost perfectly (between 
.94 and .98), indicating that all indices are highly reliable. The mean correlation coefficient 
for the six scales taking into account all periods was .64 (in the sample of new party systems 
.59, of inter-war democracies .75, of post-1990 party systems .67). The year-based index 
promoted by the current study correlated on average at .62 with the other five constructs (.57 
in the new democracy, .75 in the inter-war, and .7 in the post-90 sample), indicating the 
criterion-validity of the index (Adcock and Collier 2001). The new year-based measure also 
reflects well the theoretical expectations concerning the internal structure of closure as it 
shows formula as the most, alternation as the least central component of the syndrome.  
While the analysis above provides some ground to single out the new, year-based 
index as the one with the strongest conceptual rationale and most attractive psychometric 
features, does the index also provide us with valid measurement? This would be an easy 
question to answer if we had a straightforward theory about the relationships between closure 
and other phenomena. Closure, as discussed in the introduction, is part of a larger syndrome 
of stabilization and consolidation. In the literature these concepts are often related to the 
consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring 1999; Morlino 1998; Pridham 1990, etc.). But some 
scholars also warn us that above certain levels the degree of institutionalization and 
stabilization may become irrelevant (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 22) or even dangerous 
                                                 
7 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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(Schedler 1995) for the democratic quality of a polity. The reason why students of democracy 
should pay attention to the stabilization of party systems is rather that inchoate systems may 
be conducive to the breakdown of democracies (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 2003). 
Therefore the most adequate test is to examine the party systems of the inter-war period and 
check how the indicators of closure help us to predict whether a democracy survived or 
collapsed.  
Table 5. Necessity analysis (consistency) and degree of association (eta) between party 
system closure and democratic survival in inter-war Europe (N=19)8 
 New 
continuous 
(years) 
New 
continuous 
(governments) 
Old 
continuous 
(years) 
Old 
continuous 
(government) 
Old 
dichotomous 
(years) 
Old 
dichotomous  
(government) 
Eta ,87** ,56 ,71** ,55* ,73** ,6** 
Consistency ,91 ,73 ,82 ,73 ,82 ,73 
Notes: * significance level < 0.05, ** <0.01. Consistency scores compiled on the basis of the results obtained 
using fsQCA 2.0. 
 
According to all measures the democracies with closed party systems survived at a 
higher rate, the differences between the cases of survival and collapse were statistically 
significant (below .05). The association reached the highest level using our new, year-based 
measure (table 5, first row), providing an additional argument for relying on this index in the 
future.9 
Party system closure can be considered to be the ‘necessary condition’ for the survival 
of democracy within the framework of QCA (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).10 
Among the six indicators only our new, year-based measure passes the consistency threshold 
                                                 
8 Based on Polity IV, the “collapse group” (score < 6) includes Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Poland, Portugal and Spain. On the contrary, the “survival group” (score ≥ 6) includes Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 
9 Since the analyses above indicated that formula is the core of party system closure we checked its covariance 
with the survival of democracy. The relationships were similar, but much weaker, in some instances even 
dropping below the conventional standards of statistical significance. It seems that we need all the three 
components in order to grasp the party system closure.  
10 This type of analysis presupposes dichotomous (“absence” versus “presence”) variables. We used the mean as 
the cut-off point for restructuring closure into a two-value scale. Using Z-scores to operationalize closure, and 
employing 0 as the cut-off point, would not but to reinforce our results. Data available from the authors upon 
request. 
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of 0.9 (table 5, second row).11  All in all, the association between the two variables appears to 
be the closest according to the indicators promoted in this article. 
As a very last step in demonstrating the differences among the indices, we analyze the actual 
rankings of party systems. For the sake of simplicity only the three year-based measures are 
contrasted. According to the results, as can be seen in Table 6, there is a high degree of 
similarity between the rankings produced by the various forms of operationalization. The 
rankings based on the old dichotomous and continuous measures correlate particularly highly 
with each other, at .99. The new index is also closely related to the old dichotomous measure 
(.81), and old continuous one (.8) indices. All three forms of operationalization place Malta, 
Switzerland, United Kindom, Greece and Spain among the most closed systems. Next to 
established democracies some of the new states exhibiting authoritarian tendencies (Georgia, 
Montenegro) also rank high in terms of closure. The concentrated party systems (Malta, U.K., 
Spain after 1979, Austria) score high, as expected, but some fragmented systems 
(Switzerland12, Norway, Sweden) also achieved high ranking. Within the group of established 
democracies Belgium, the Netherlands and, especially, Italy and Finland, have the most open 
systems. Some Eastern European and Balkan systems, Hungary, Kosovo, Albania, Moldova 
or Turkey achieved mid-level closure. Among the most open systems one finds typically 
current Eastern European and defunct Western European systems. 
Table 6. Scores of closure according to the different indexes in 60 European party systems 
(1848-2013) 
Party system Time period New continuous Old continuous Old dichotomous 
Switzerland 1897-2013 98,9 96,6 95,5 
Malta 1964-2013 98,7 98,7 98,7 
United Kingdom 1919-2013 98,4 97,4 94,2 
Montenegro 2007-2013 97,3 75,8 66,7 
Greece 1975-2013 97,1 96,1 95,6 
Ireland 1923-2013 96,8 94,2 92,9 
Spain 1979-2013 96,1 96,1 96,1 
Liechtenstein 1993-2013 95,9 94,9 93,7 
                                                 
11 Considering party system openness as a necessary condition for the collapse of democracy (see Hermens 1941; 
Karvonen and Quenter 2003), the three indexes do not differ from each other, pointing to openness as an “almost 
necessary” condition (0.88) 
12 Obviously due to the ‘magic formula’ of coalition-composition.  
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Norway 1905-2013 95,9 94,4 93,5 
Sweden 1917-2013 95,6 95,1 93,3 
Austria 1946-2013 95,3 94,4 92,7 
Denmark 1911-2013 95,2 92,9 91,3 
France 1968-2013 94,2 74,5 67,4 
Portugal 1976-2013 94,2 92,3 89,4 
Germany 1949-2013 93,8 90,4 87 
Luxembourg 1920-2013 93,6 94,3 91,3 
Georgia 2004-2013 93,3 93,3 93,3 
Iceland 1944-2013 91,6 90,5 84,3 
The Netherlands 1918-2013 91,5 85,9 80,1 
Belgium 1919-2013 91,3 86,4 80,3 
Hungary 1990-2013 90,7 86,2 83,4 
Turkey 1946-1953 90,5 90,5 90,5 
Kosovo 2008-2013 90,5 85 80 
Andorra 1994-2013 90 90,8 90 
Ukraine 2002-2013 89,7 62 58,3 
Albania 2002-2013 89,1 65,3 56,9 
Italy 1948-2013 89 71,5 62,7 
Turkey 1983-2013 89 88,8 86,1 
Romania 1996-2013 88,6 64 57,2 
Czechoslovakia 1920-1938 88,5 57 46,3 
Finland 1945-2013 88,5 76,2 68,9 
Macedonia 1992-2013 88,5 74,9 66,6 
Moldova 1994-2013 88,5 84,7 82,5 
Spain 1900-1923 88,1 84,3 78,2 
Slovenia 1993-2013 88 73 63,2 
Slovakia 1993-2013 87,5 78,6 70,6 
Cyprus 1978-2013 87,4 80,4 73,3 
Czech Republic 1993-2013 87,3 84,7 77,8 
Bulgaria 1991-2013 87,3 80,1 75,4 
Austria 1920-1932 87 76,7 69,4 
Croatia  2000-2013 86,9 67,2 61,5 
France 1876-1940 85,9 70,4 60,2 
Estonia 1992-2013 85,7 73,7 65,9 
Serbia 2001-2013 83,3 61,7 50 
Russia 2000-2006 83 82,9 76,2 
San Marino 1993-2013 82,9 78,8 68,3 
Lithuania 1993-2013 82,7 75,8 67,5 
Poland 1991-2013 81,7 72,8 65,9 
Turkey 1961-1979 81,4 78,8 70 
France 1946-1957 79,1 51,8 29,3 
Spain 1931-1936 78,9 55,9 38,7 
Latvia 1923-1934 78,1 41,5 23,2 
Latvia 1993-2013 77,7 62,5 46,7 
Portugal 1911-1925 77,5 71,2 63 
Finland 1917-1930 76,9 71 64,1 
Germany 1919-1932 74,9 55,2 37,2 
Greece 1946-1948 74,6 68,2 58,3 
Estonia 1921-1934 72,3 54,2 34,2 
Poland 1922-1926 67,6 61 44,4 
France 1848-1851 59,3 67,6 50 
 23 
In spite of the high correlation among rankings, the new index shows a number of 
counties (particularly Montenegro, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, France IV, Albania, and 
Romania) considerably more structured, while others (Turkey, Russia, San Marino, Czech 
Republic, pre-war Finland and current Lithuania) more inchoate than the older measures. The 
difference between the scales becomes somewhat more understandable if one zooms in on 
certain specific regions. Given that the eleven Eastern European new EU states have similar 
time-frames and since they are the ones that are scrutinized most intensively from the point of 
view of stabilization, a close look at this region can help us best to make sense of the 
differences among the three indices. According to all of them the majority of the Eastern 
Central European party systems appear in the open half of the continuum (Table 7). While 
Hungary is categorized according to all measures as a relatively closed system, and Latvia as 
an extremely open one, the ranking slightly differs for the other countries. Within the regional 
framework the new index (rightmost column) placed Slovenia, Romania and Croatia higher, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland lower than the others. 
Table 7.  Ranking position of Eastern Central European party systems (1990-2013) 
Party system New continuous Old continuous Old dichotomous 
Hungary 21 21 20 
Romania 29 50 49 
Slovenia 35 40 42 
Slovakia 36 32 30 
Czech Republic 38 25 26 
Bulgaria 38 29 28 
Croatia 41 48 45 
Estonia 43 39 39 
Lithuania 47 36 35 
Poland 48 41 40 
Latvia 53 51 53 
 
The differences are in line with what the literature tells us about these party systems. 
Bulgaria and Lithuania are among the least institutionalized systems in the region, with the 
largest electoral volatility and the highest number of new parties at elections, while Romania 
and Slovenia have considerably more stable party landscape. The previous operationalizations 
misplace the latter two party systems because they give too much weight to frequent but only 
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minor changes in government. In Slovenia most governments have been built around the same 
political parties (e.g. LDS and SD or SLS and SDS, 7 times each), but because they often 
incorporated new (mostly minor) actors (e.g. SKD, DeSUS, Zares, NSi, PS, DLGV), 
alternation and formula acquire values close to 0 according to the old operationalizations. Our 
proposed index reflects much better the fact that the coalition patterns tend to be familiar. As 
a result Slovenia appears as more closed than, for example, Bulgaria, where governments are 
often formed by parties (e.g. NSDV, GERB) established right before the elections. 
Within the spectrum of the 11 new member states we can also check the validity of the 
closure indices by contrasting the closure-averages of the post-Communist decades with the 
averages of electoral volatility and parliamentary fragmentation. The correlation matrix 
indicated that closure is related, as expected, to low fragmentation and low volatility. The new 
index covaried more strongly with both fragmentation and volatility: -.66 (.sig .03) and -
.51(sig. 11), than the old ones (continuous -.43, sig. .19, and .06, sig. .97, dichotomous -.61, 
sig. 05, and -.09, sig. .813). 
The cases of post-independence Montenegro, present-day France and inter-war 
Czechoslovakia illuminate further the difference between the indices. The existing rankings 
place Montenegro among the open systems while our index ranks it among the closed ones. In 
fact in Montenegro the same coalition of parties (DPS, SDP and DUA) has governed the 
country since the adoption of independence in 2006. The old operationalizations misclassify 
the case because they give to much weight to one, very minor change: the fact that in 2009 the 
Bosniak minority represented by one single minister was incorporated into the coalition. The 
same could be said about the French party system during the 5th Republic. According to the 
old forms of operationalization this case is in the open segment of the continuum, appearing 
as even less stable than Bulgaria or Lithuania.  But in fact government-building in France has 
been relatively well structured around two clearly opposed party blocs, the center-right and 
                                                 
13 Pearson correlations with 2-tailed significance levels. 
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the center-left. The existing ways of measurement misclassified France because they gave 
excessive weight to small parties (e.g. CDP, CR, MDD, PSD, ADD, GE, MDC, NC, LP or 
W) and to minor reshuffles of governments, thereby not only decreasing closure on access but 
also exaggerating the innovative character of the formula. As far as inter-war Czechoslovakia 
is concerned, our index classifies it as closed, in line with the literature that considers it as a 
highly stable system (Capoccia 2005). The other indices treat it as open due to the large 
number of cabinet reshuffles. In fact the Czechoslovak governments were dominated by the 
same five parties (RSZML, CNSS, CSDSD, CND and CSL) throughout the entire period, one 
of them, the RSZML, was never out of government, and the five parties cooperated so closely 
that they were even considered to be one political entity, the ‘Petka’. This underlying stability 
is reflected only by the new indicators. 
 
Conclusions 
The principal outcome of the article is a new operationalization of party system 
closure. The existing operationalizations were incoherent, did not fit the original 
conceptualization, did not capture well the degree of predictability and were unsuitable for 
measuring time periods. They fell short of the standards of symmetry, precision, applicability 
and homogeneous logic. The new indicators are more uniform and transparent in their logic of 
construction. They follow the original three-component model of closure, and they are all 
based on percentages of ministers controlled by parties. The beginning and the end of 
governments are defined in terms of both party configurations and elections and therefore we 
are able to record ‘no alternation’, in the spirit of the original conceptualization of the concept 
of closure. The new indicator of government formula can be applied to specific government-
changes and to time periods. The temporal dimension is taken care of by taking into account 
the number of years spent under a particular pattern. 
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The theoretical justification of the new index was complemented with empirical 
analyses. Across 19 inter-war European party systems closure was shown to covary with the 
survival of democracy. Examining 60 European party systems from 1848 till 2013, and then 
double-checking the results on various subsamples, the analysis has shown that the three 
constituent components of closure are positively related, but they do not attain a perfect 
unidimensionality. It seems that both conceptually and empirically, government formula is 
more central to party system closure than alternation.  
The analysis found that the most frequent governmental pattern is characterized by a 
combination of partial alternation, innovative formula, and no new party included into the 
government. But most of the time we live under closed patterns:  governments which are 
formed after complete or no alternation, containing no new parties and reproducing earlier 
coalition formulae. 
Finally, the application of the new measures to 60 European cases demonstrated that 
closure can be achieved in new democracies with authoritarian elements (Montenegro, 
Georgia), but it is more common in well-established democracies (U.K., Switzerland, 
Norway, etc.). The concentrated party systems (Malta, U.K., Spain after 1979) scored high, 
but some fragmented systems (Switzerland, Norway, Sweden) also achieved high ranking. 
The post-war systems tend to be much more closed than the ones that existed during the early 
20th or late 19th century, and Eastern Europe lags behind the West in terms of closure (Casal 
Bértoa, 2013). Countries that have permissive institutions (i.e. small thresholds in front of the 
formation and electoral and governmental success of new parties) tend to have more open 
systems, but the ranking proves that party system closure is far from being determined by 
institutional rules.  
The proposed formula for closure appears as most relevant for multiparty 
parliamentary democracies, but in fact it can be applied to two-party systems and to 
presidential regimes as well, though in those cases it may not capture the dynamics of party 
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politics to the same extent. The article demonstrated its utility for European democracies, but 
hopefully researchers will consider its applications also for other regions. 
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